On July 15, 1979, US President Jimmy Carter gave what some historians regard as the most important speech of his presidency (Morris, 1996) . He spoke to the American people from the oval office about what he described as a national "crisis of confidence." The speech became known as the "malaise" speech. It was against this pessimistic assessment of the national mood that Ronald Reagan pitched his optimistic campaign message in 1980. Reagan offered a more confident vision that carried him to electoral victory. Indeed, analysis of speeches by US presidential candidates suggest that optimism may predict subsequent electoral victory (Zullow & Seligman, 1990) .
The theory that confidence leads to success is popular, both among the lay public and in the field of positive psychology. Books from "Think and grow rich" (Hill, 1972) to "The secret" (Byrne, 2006) have touted the benefits of optimistic thinking on subsequent life outcomes.
Researchers, likewise, have concluded that optimism and positive emotions are good for you (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005; Scheier & Carver, 1993) . In particular, displaying optimism and confidence is useful in social settings, where it can help persuade others that you know what to do and that they should support you (Radzevick & Moore, 2011; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001 ). More confident people often advance to positions of status and leadership for exactly this reason (Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012) . The implication for would-be leaders is that they should express more confidence than their rivals.
In this paper, we consider the alternative perspective. We test the possibility that greater confidence can lead to reduced commitment and reduced effort among supporters. If you are convinced that your side is so strong that victory is assured, then additional effort is not necessary. Those who envision a bright future might actually be less likely to succeed if their confidence undermines their willingness to work to achieve it (Oettingen & Mayer, 2002; Oettingen, 1996) . On the other hand, those who envision how things could go wrong may be more motivated and better prepared to effectively meet adversity. Research on defensive pessimism highlights the motivating potential of anticipating disaster (Norem & Cantor, 1986) .
Avoiding a possible loss can be more motivating than pursuing a possible gain (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Rozin & Royzman, 2001 ). This paper tests these opposing predictions for the effects of confidence. Are people more motivated to support a political candidate who is ahead in the polls or who is trailing the polls? If candidates want to maximize supporters' motivation to donate to the campaign, volunteer for the campaign, or get out the vote, what should they say about whether they are winning or losing? In five studies, we examine how the belief that a candidate is currently ahead vs. behind affects people's motivation to support the candidate by volunteering, contributing, or voting. We report three online survey experiments on Mechanical Turk, one archival study examining all emails sent by the campaigns of President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney in the 2012 U.S.
Presidential election, and one fundraising field experiment in the 2014 Florida Governor's race.
Study 1: Underdog vs. Bandwagon Effects
Study 1 examines a moderator of confidence's effect on motivation. Consistent with the power of defensive pessimism, we hypothesized that people who are committed to a candidate would become more motivated after learning that the candidate is behind in the polls. However, for people who are uncommitted, learning that a candidate is behind in the polls would not increase motivation to support the candidate, and could even undermine people's support for a candidate due to herding or bandwagon effects (Banerjee, 1992; Gerber & Rogers, 2009; Mehrabian, 1998) . Our hypothesis, then, is an interaction between voter commitment to a candidate and confidence in that candidate's likelihood of victory.
Method
Participants. We opened the survey to 400 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) . We selected this sample size ex-ante based on a complete guess for how big our sample size needed to be in order to detect the hypothesized interaction effect. We restricted the sample to those with Internet Protocol addresses in the United States and paid $.50 per respondent. For this and all our studies, we report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all conditions, and all measures.
Immediately following the consent form and before encountering the actual experimental materials, we included an attention check. Our survey ejected participants who failed the attention check and did not allow them to continue. They did not get paid and are not included in subject counts. The final sample includes 402 people.
Design and procedure. The experiment had a 2 (order) X 2 (winning vs. losing) factorial design. Each participant read the same four news items about a political candidate named Kendall Jenkins:
1. Kendall Jenkins served in the Peace Corps for two years after graduating from college 2. Jenkins founded a software company that was later sold to Microsoft 3. Jenkins served as mayor for a town, and that during Jenkins's time as mayor, the city budget went from a $2 million annual deficit to a $1 million annual surplus 4. Jenkins worked successfully with people across the political spectrum to get things done After each news item, they answered: How would it affect the chances that you would vote for the candidate? (on a 5-point scale from Much less likely to Much more likely).
A fifth news item presented the candidate's current standing in the polls. Half of participants read that Jenkins was losing to the other candidate in the race, 47% to 48% (with 5% of voters undecided), and again reported how this would affect their chances of voting for the candidate (on the same 5-point scale). The other half of participants learned that Jenkins was ahead, 48% to 47%. This was the manipulation of confidence in winning vs. losing.
Half of participants encountered this fifth item last in the series, and the other half encountered it first. This manipulation of order was intended to vary commitment to the candidate. Given that the four news items were positive, we expected that participants who got them first would thereby become more committed to the candidate when they learned the polling results.
Results
On average, participants rated the four news items at 3.96, significantly above the scale midpoint of 3, t(401)=41.01, p < 0.001. As expected, these news items were positive, and increased participants' support for the candidate.
As for participants' response to the news that the candidate was either winning or losing in the polls, a 2 X 2 ANOVA reveals a significant main effect of order, F(398, 1)=7.56, p=0.006. This is because support was stronger after having read four positive news items about the candidate. This main effect is qualified by the hypothesized interaction between winning/losing and news order, F(398, 1)=4.87, p=0.028. This interaction is illustrated in Figure 1 . 
Discussion
When participants learn that their favored candidate is just behind in the polls they increased their interest in supporting their favored candidate. However, when participants did not yet know anything about the candidate -and were thus uncommitted -learning that a candidate was trailing in the polls decreased their tendency to support the candidate.
Study 2:

Winning/Losing and Closeness of an Election Affect Volunteer and Donation Pledges
A one percentage point lead is likely to be within the margin of error for most opinion polls. Nevertheless, in Study 1 such a small difference affected participants' inclination to support their preferred candidate. The small difference between the candidates in the poll leaves open the question of whether the beneficial effect of losing holds when the situation is more dire.
Would learning that one's candidate was far behind in the polls still increase motivation among 
Method
Participants. We opened the survey to 300 people on Mechanical Turk and wound up with a final sample of 305. They were located in the US and paid $0.50.
Design. This study had a 2 (winning vs. losing) X 2 (close vs. blowout) design.
Participants were told to imagine they were supporting a political candidate running for office.
They then read one of the following messages: "It's close, but we're losing"; "It's close, but
we're winning"; "It's a blowout, but we're losing"; or "It's a blowout, but we're winning."
Participants then answered two questions: The other half of recipients were randomly assigned to receive the Losing condition email. It read:
We've fallen behind Rick Scott in the latest poll!!! Florida's the mother of ALL swing states and we need more resources to KNOCK OUT the king of voter suppression and his allies -but you have to GIVE NOW! Donate in the next 24 HOURS to get your gift DOUBLED!
All other content in the two emails was identical. See Supplemental Online Materials for complete reproductions of both emails and for the actual polls referenced in the email messages.
Participants. 31,605 past donors were randomly assigned to the Winning condition and 31,654 past donors were randomly assigned to the Losing condition. 301,372 prospective donors were randomly assigned to the Winning condition and 301,353 prospective donors were randomly assigned to the Losing condition.
Results
"Opened" Emails. Each email includes images that recipients can choose to download.
There are a variety of ways that these images can be downloaded (i.e., one's email client could automatically download images, one's email client could download images if the recipient views the email for a set period of time, etc.). One way for images to be downloaded is by recipients choosing to open the email in their email client so that they can read the entirety of the email message. This is referred to as "opening" the email, even though some recipients read the email and never download the images, while others download the images but never read the email. As such, differences in email "opening" reflect a conservative test of whether the initial text in the body of the email motivated recipients to read the rest of the email. See the Supplemental Online Materials for a complete account of how the donation files were integrated into a master file.
Study 3b
Method Study 3b was a replication of Study 3a. The DGA sent fundraising emails to the same list of recipients eleven days after Study 3a. Recipients were randomly assigned to receive one of two conditions. As with Study 3a, in Study 3b both conditions involved fundraising emails that were identical except for minor changes referencing whether the Democratic candidate, Charlie 
Discussion
Emphasizing that an election is close but that one's preferred candidate is losing increases the proportion of recipients that pay attention to an email, the proportion of recipients that clicks on the link to donate in the email, the proportion of recipients that actually donates, and how much money the email raises. Figure 2 shows that these effects are sizable and consequential. 
Study 4: Lay Beliefs
The previous studies demonstrate the motivating power of low confidence. Study 1 and Study 2 shows that Amazon's Mechanical Turk participants are more motivated to act when their preferred candidate is barely losing, rather than barely winning. Study 4 explores whether this same worker pool can anticipate the motivating power of campaign under-confidence.
Method
Participants. We conducted this study on Amazon's Mechanical Turk with 110 participants. We selected this sample size ex-ante based on a complete guess for how big our sample size needed to be in order to detect if participants had an intuition. As before, we restricted the sample to those with Internet Protocol addresses in the United States and paid $.50 per respondent. Average age was 33.6 years old and 35% of respondents were women.
Immediately following the consent form and before encountering the actual experimental materials, we asked participants to enter their identification code. If they had participated in one of the previous studies on this topic we did not allow them to continue. They did not get paid and are not included in subject counts.
Design and procedure. Participants read about the design of Study 2 and learned that
the participants in that study were assigned to one of two conditions (close but losing, close but winning) or four conditions (close but losing, close but winning, blowout and winning, blowout and losing). Participants were told that Study 2's participants were asked how likely they were to support the campaign by volunteering and by donating. Participants were asked to predict which message was most motivating for volunteering and for donating. They earned a bonus of $0.10 for each correct prediction. We randomized whether they predicted volunteering or donation first, and since that did not affect results it is not discussed again.
Results
Participants who were told about the two messages leaned, nonsignificantly, towards predicting that the "it's close, but we're losing" message (57%) would motivate participants to volunteer and donate (the results were identical for the two measures) more than the "it's close and we're winning" message (43%), Chi Square (1, N=56)=1.143, p=0.29.
Participants who were told about the four messages predicted that the "it's close, but we're losing" (39%) and the "it's close but we're winning" messages (43%) would motivate volunteering more than the "it's a blowout but we're losing" (7%) and "it's a blowout but we're winning" (11%) messages, Chi Square (1, N=54)=21.41, p<0.001. There is no significant difference between the fraction that predicted that the "it's close, but we're losing" would dominate and the fraction that predicted that the "it's close but we're winning" message would dominate, Chi Square (1, N=44)=0.09, p=0.76.
Participants also predicted that the "it's close, but we're losing" message (39%) and the "it's close, but we're winning" message (43%) would motivate donating more than the "it's a blowout but we're losing" (0%) and the "it's a blowout but we're winning messages" messages (15%), Chi Square (1, N=54)=26.74, p<0.001. There is no significant difference between the fraction that predicted that the "it's close, but we're losing" would dominate and the fraction that predicted that the "it's close but we're winning" message would dominate, Chi Square (1, N=46)=0.78, p=0.38.
Discussion
Participants did not have a strong intuition about the motivating power of their preferred candidate being barely behind in polls. That said, they did show a strong (correct) intuition that elections that are close would generate more support than campaigns that are not.
Study 5: Do Campaigns Know?
Presenting low confidence to a candidate's supporters motivates action to support the candidate. Study 5 explores whether actual political communications to supporters reflect this insight.
Method
We obtained copies of 6,894 unique email messages sent out to supporters during the 
Discussion
The vast majority of campaign emails to supporters do not make reference to whether or not the race is close. However, when they do reference closeness, they tend to emphasize that the campaign is losing (and not winning). The emails sent by those who develop campaign messages appear to have been developed by people who know that low confidence is especially motivating to supporters. It is important to note that while campaign emails tend to reflect this insight, it is possible that the insight is not explicitly known by those who developed them within the campaigns. This is because of the prevalence of A/B testing in campaign fundraising. This constant testing of widely varying messages could generate the pattern we observe: messages highlighting that the candidate is barely losing may tend to dominate other messages.
Interestingly, this would result in campaigns communications tending to reflect the motivating power of expressing under-confidence, without campaigns knowing it.
General Discussion
Political candidates are a famously optimistic lot. Even long-shot candidates who are far behind in the polls regularly claim that they have a real shot at winning. Is that the best strategy for motivating their supporters? Our results suggest that, at least under some circumstances, candidates could benefit from making a somewhat less confident claim: that they are just behind their rivals. Across six studies we consistently demonstrate the motivating power of underconfidence. While uncommitted voters tend to prefer the candidate who is barely winning (rather than barely losing), those who already support a candidate are more motivated when the candidate is barely losing (rather than barely winning). Two fundraising experiments (with 1M+ observations) showed that this effect is substantial. Emails emphasizing that the preferred candidate was barely losing raised 55% more money than emails emphasizing that he was barely winning. While survey respondents were not particularly aware of the motivating power of under-confidence, emails collected during the 2012 Presidential election tended to reflect this insight. When those emails noted that the race was close, they were more likely to say that the preferred candidates were losing.
However, it is worth highlighting Study 1's interaction between confidence and commitment. The "we're losing" message was most effective at increasing support among those who already viewed the focal candidate favorably. Among the undecided, there was some evidence of a bandwagon effect: they were more likely to support the candidate who led in the polls. Research on reporting coverage of political polling results documents evidence of both bandwagon and underdog effects (McAllister & Studlar, 1991) . Those findings are compatible with ours.
While Study 5 found that Obama and Romney's fundraising emails were more likely to say that the candidate was barely losing than that he was barely winning, recall that the recipients were likely supporters. It is plausible that the opposite communication pattern holds when candidates communicate during efforts to persuade voters to support them, such as during televised interviews or speeches. Candidates may present themselves as exceedingly confident because it may influence uncommitted voters. This is exactly the kind of custom tailored messaging that is enabled by contemporary micro-targeting tools (Nickerson & Rogers, 2014) .
Future research should explore whether this strategic display of over-and under-confidence does arise.
Our results join a growing body of research identifying the circumstances under which confidence is helpful. It most emphatically is not the case that more confidence is always better -despite the assertions of self-help books. Overconfident entrepreneurs take too many risks.
Overconfidence impairs investors' performance. Overconfident leaders engage in too many competitions, fights, strikes, lawsuits, and wars. Overconfident skydivers, rock climbers, and big wave surfers have shorter life expectancies. And overconfident messages assuring certain victory can dampen the support for a political candidate. Clearly, in some circumstances confidence is conducive to higher performance (Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007) . However, when performance depends on effort, the confident belief that success is assured can be self-negating (Vancouver & Kendall, 2006; Vancouver, Thompson, Tischner, & Putka, 2002) . The present research suggests that this is the case in politics.
Our results are consistent with research on defensive pessimism, which shows the benefits of thinking negatively (Norem, 2002) . However, most of that research has focused on how individuals motivate themselves to exert effort to avoid failure. Our results differ in that we
show how a leader can motivate supporters by displaying moderate pessimism. When leaders conveys under-confidence to their supporters they have a motivating effect that is similar to athletes being barely behind at halftime in a close sporting match: it summons increased effort since victory is just within reach (Berger & Pope, 2011) .
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Sent on 6/19 Beating them this November, NOW, is the only way to stop them in 2016.
Republicans don't hold back ANYTHING in Florida because they know how important it is to the presidency. Just ask George W. Bush and Karl Rove about 2000.
If we're going to BEAT Rick Scott and other Tea Party Republicans, you need to give in the next 24 hours to help us raise $22,000 to stay on track to hit our goals -a donor will DOUBLE your gift.
We've got to be able to protect every vote, in every key state, to WIN.
That's it, %%FIRST NAME%%.
If you've saved payment info with ActBlue Express, your donation to the DGA will go through immediately:
Click to donate $%%1XHPC%% right away.
Click to donate $%%2XHPC%% right away.
Click to donate $%%4XHPC%% right away.
Or click here to donate another amount immediately to defeat Rick Scott and extreme votesuppressing governors. Double your gift in the next 24 hours! Florida and other battlegrounds are ours! In the states where voters see how extreme these guys are up close, we're in the driver's seat.
Help us to victory by DONATING NOW. We need you.
Thanks,
Mark Giangreco Digital Director
Contribute
This email was sent to melanie@annelewisllc.com. To unsubscribe from the DGA email list, click here.
Paid for by DGA Action, www.democraticgovernors.org, and not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee. Beating them this November, NOW, is the only way to stop them in 2016.
LOSING / NEGATIVE ----------Forwarded message ----------
If you've saved payment info with ActBlue Express, your donation to the DGA will go through immediately:
Mark Giangreco Digital Director
Contribute
Paid for by DGA Action, www.democraticgovernors.org, and not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee. 
Send on 6/30
----------Forwarded message ---------
Complete Donation Calculation Procedure
Winning and Losing Studies 3a and 3b
After the intervention, the vendor ( There are a handful of important elements to note about these two datasets. First, the random unique identifiers in Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 were not linkable. Second, Dataset 2 shows that there were more total donations made than Dataset 1 would suggest. According to the fundraising consultant, this may have resulted from donors using different email addresses.
Donations reported in Dataset 1 reflect only donations made using the email address that was used by the vendor to send out the emails. If a recipient donated money using an email address that was different from the one that the vendor used, the donation would not be reported in Dataset 1, but would be reported in Dataset 2. Importantly, neither dataset included the email addresses used by the vendor to send the emails or used by the recipient to make a donation.
This means that Dataset 1underestimates the total number of donations a given email generated, and the total dollar value of donations a given email generated. In order to compare the number of donors generated by each email in each study, and to compare the amount of money raised by each email in each study, we developed the following dataset integration -All analyses reported in the manuscript use Dataset 1.1.
